Systemic risk in a simple definition is potential loss suffered by the financial system which is commonly caused by the individual institution in the system. The default of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 which were two of the five largest investment banks in the U.S at the time has changed the perspective that Too-Big To Fail was not solely an issue in the vulnerable financial system. Nevertheless, recent studies indicate that Too-Connected To Fail (TCTF) problem is actually the main issue of the vulnerable financial system. This study provides early warning system regarding the systemic event by measuring the systemic risk in Indonesian Islamic commercial banks (ICBs). This study employs a balance sheet network analysis to measure the systemic risk in Indonesia ICBs which relies only on the interconnection among banks in the system. The purposive sampling method is applied in this study involving 10 banks in 2012 and 11 banks in 2013 and 2014. This study investigates the capital loss suffered by an individual institution in case of bank default in the system, the Too-Connected to Fail (TCTF) risk which measures how risky the individual bank towards others and system, and the TCTF vulnerability which measures how vulnerable an individual bank in case of a bank default in the system. It is forecast that this study can be one of the references for the macro prudential and micro prudential supervisions in Indonesia.
Introduction
The evolution of financial world is getting faster. The evolution leads the system to be more complex and highly interconnected, which in turn increases vulnerability of the system. In the last several years, regulators have been mainly concerned about "too-big-too-fail" (TBTF) problems that in turn lead to macro and micro financial regulations being more concern to huge financial institutions with large amount of assets.
The presence of 2008 financial crisis, however, showed the evidence that the TBTF was not solely an issue in the increase of global financial system convergence. It has been evidenced that the trigger of the crisis was not the institutions with large assets, but their balance sheet structure were highly interconnected in the system. Mortgage lenders were run out of cash at the time and triggered the giant financial institution into bankruptcy. Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the top 5 largest U.S investment bank at the time, were default.
The conventional view regarding the TBTF is not in the spotlight anymore. Moreover, many studies proposed that an institution considered to be TBTF was not necessarily considered to be interconnected in the system. Meanwhile, recent studies also confirmed that the main determinant of the crisis was tooconnected-to fail (TCTF) problem. Aldasoro and Angeloni (2013) stated that banks with considerable market share or assets had less systemic importance rather than banks, which became big players in the interbank market. An institution considered to be TBTF is not necessarily TCTF (Lau, 2013) . Measuring systemic risk based on the linkage of banks balance sheet is necessary. The balance sheet network analysis is the model that can satisfy the TCTF problem which becomes the main issue of systemic event.
The balance sheet network analysis can be applied on the conventional banks and the Islamic banks. The balance sheet network analysis mainly focuses on the linkage between institutions. There would be no different in term of application of this model between the conventional and Islamic banks. In this regard, balance sheet network analysis relies only on the assessment of direct exposures, or network exposures, gathered from balance-sheet information (Lau, 2013) . The outputs of this model are capital losses of each bank in case of bank default, the TCTF risk of each bank and the TCTF vulnerability of each bank.
Financial crisis always requires expensive price to recover. Financial crisis in the 1997/1998 showed the huge impact of banking crisis. Restructuring of the system spent 45 percent of the Indonesia GDP (Simorangkir, 2012) . Financial crisis is likely to recur in the future, especially with the vulnerability of the banking system recently. Contagion default risk causes systemic risk, which is a crucial reason for the financial crisis (Ascarya et al. 2012) . Prevention is therefore immensely important. Assessing systemic risk is one of the prevention steps in the systemic event.
In the last 6 years, Islamic banks in Indonesia have shown incredible development. The Indonesia Financial Service Authority (OJK) has released a statistical data of Islamic banks in Indonesia in December 2014. As at December 2014, the total assets of Islamic banks were IDR 278 trillion. It grew around 4 times compared to 2009, which was only IDR 68 trillion. Despite growing quite incredibly, Islamic banks in Indonesia are still new where the total assets of Indonesia Islamic banks as at December 2014 was only about 4% compared to the conventional banks. Albeit relatively small in term of total assets, early warning is necessary to do in order to prevent systemic event. Following this, this study intends to analyse and ultimately offer early warning of capital losses suffered by ICBs system if there is a bank default in the system, determine which bank has large TCTF risk among ICBs in Indonesia and to determine which bank is the most vulnerable if there is shock triggered by other banks.
The rest of paper is organized as follows.Ssection 2 explains the literature review, section 3 presents the research method, section 4 presents the simulation and results. Finally, section 5 concludes the study.
Literature Review
Systemic risk threatens the financial system, which has the influence to destabilize the economy of a country or even wider. Global financial meltdown in 2008 was an evidence of a systemic event which was triggered by subprime mortgages and destroyed financial system of the United States and the global financial system. The U.S economy fell down and forced the Federal Reserve to implement uncommon monetary policy and the quantitative easing (QE) in order to re-stimulate the U.S economy.
In a simpler explanation, systemic risk is a potential loss in the system, which is triggered by an individual default of an institution in the system and may damage other institutions. Systemic risk is a risk that not only impacts an individual financial institution but others too. It has impact on the other financial institutions, on the real domestic economy, on the other countries or even globally (Aldasoro and Angeloni, 2013) . Other researchers define systemic risk as the risk that comes up from the financial institution because of insufficient solvency and liquidity squeeze in the financial institution especially for financial intermediation or banks with probability to spread out the impact to the other financial institutions or to the real sector Blancer et al. (2013) .
Systemic risk has two main elements: initial default trigger and distribution of loss. Initial default trigger is an individual default institution, which leads to systemic event. The default of a bank has two main sources, which are, credit shock and funding shock. Distribution of loss of an institution to other institutions in the system is commonly known as contagion risk.
Loss distribution will not occur in the absence of balance sheet interconnection among institutions in the system. Interconnectedness among the institutions in the financial system brings greater fragility to the system. Loss distribution caused by a default institution which has great interconnection to the participants in the system will be easily spread out to the other institutions. Huser (2015) stated that, banking sector is considered to be a network where` banks are highly interconnected through both sides of their balance sheet, assets and liabilities. Interbank transactions are like "wireless connection" among banks, creating the interconnectedness of the bank's balance sheet.
Interbank transactions have an important role in the systemic event. Interbank transactions create the interconnection between banks balance sheet in the system and facilitate the contagion loss. The ignition chain of the systemic risk is the interbank transactions. Systemic risk and interbank transactions have a positive relationship (Krause and Giansante, 2012) . Greater interbank transactions will lead to greater probability of systemic risk and fragility of the financial system as a whole. Aldasoro and Angeloni (2013) stated that, midsize bank with the largest interbank transactions in the system has more systemic importance than large size bank with small amount of interbank. Turkish banking crisis in 2000, the major player of interbank which known as Demirbank is the trigger of the crisis as argued by Kuzubas et al. (2014) .
Based on the discussion above, it can be clearly argued that interbank transactions are the key players of the systemic event, which leads to contagion loss. More attention to the big size player is not necessary anymore and the regulators must give more attention to the major player in the interbank loan. The TBTF problem is not the main transmission of systemic event, but the TCTF problem is.
Islamic banks are the financial intermediary that follows the Shariah principles. The financial transaction in Islamic banks must avoid the unlawful (Haram) transaction. The unlawful transactions are the interest based transaction (Riba), absolute risk outcome (Gharar), winning of a party is linked with the loss of another (Myser) or usually called zero sum game, and financing for unlawful business for example casino, club and so forth (Hanif, 2014) . Riba in the general meaning is an extra charge of money for lending and borrowing, or conventionally known as interest. Al-Baqarah 2:275 states that:
"Those who take interest will not stand but as stands whom the demon has driven crazy by his touch. That is because they have said: Trading is but like riba. And Allah has permitted trading and prohibited riba. So, whoever receives an advice from his Lord and stops, he is allowed what has passed, and his matter is up to Allah. And the ones who revert back, those are the people of Fire. There they remain forever".
The prohibition of riba is clearly stated in the Qur'an. In order to replace the interest in the Islamic banks business operation, Islamic banks have several contracts that are grouped into two, which are, the profit-loss sharing (PLS) contract and the leased based contract.
In the past three years, the development of ICBs in Indonesia showed admirable growth. The number of offices and total assets of the system represent the growth of this industry. Between 2012 until 2014, the number of ICBs in Indonesia has increased to 12 banks from 11 banks previously. The increase number of banks leads to an increase number of offices. Figure 1 presents the number offices of the Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia. Number of offices has increased over the years. In the last three years, number of offices grew around 23 percent, from 1,745 offices to 2,151 offices. The total assets of ICBs have also significantly increased in the last 3 years. 
Research Method
This study is a quantitative exploratory type of study. This study uses secondary data which is taken from an audited financial report of each sample bank. Purposive sampling has been employed in this study. The sample banks must satisfy several criteria below: a. Acknowledged by the Indonesian Financial Service Authority (OJK). b. The object is absolutely an entity. It is not become a part of other entities and incorporated as perseroan terbatas (PT).
c. The banks publish audited annual report and complete with notes to the financial statements in the period of the research, which is from 2012 until 2014.
In 2012, there are 10 banks that have satisfied those criteria. Meanwhile in 2013 and 2014, there are 11 banks that have satisfied the criteria. PT. Bank Victoria Syariah 3.
PT. Bank BRI Syariah 4.
PT. Bank BNI Syariah 5.
PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri 6.
PT. Bank Syariah Mega Indonesia 7.
PT. Bank Panin Syariah Tbk. 8.
PT. Bank Syariah Bukopin 9.
PT. BCA Syariah 10.
PT. May bank Syariah Indonesia Source: Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 2012 PT. Bank Victoria Syariah 3.
Harjito, D.A. & Wiratama, M.A.B.H/ Balance Sheet Network Analysis in Islamic Banks in Indonesia
PT. May Bank Syariah Indonesia 11.
PT. Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional Syariah Source: Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 2014
The Model
This study employs the balance sheet network analysis to measure systemic risk on ICBs in Indonesia. This model relies only on the direct network impact. It focuses mainly on the balance sheet interconnection between banks in the system, which causes a contagion loss in the system. The final outputs of this analysis are two measurements of systemic risk, which are, the TCTF risk and the TCTF vulnerability. The TCTF risk represents the systemic importance of a bank. The TCTF vulnerability measures the fragility of a bank towards the contagion loss which is caused by bank default in the system. This study requires a simulation of bank default in the system in order to measure systemic risk. This model can accommodate credit and funding shock as the default trigger. This study employs credit shock as the default trigger. Besides that, this model requires the assumption of Loss Given Default (LGD). This study employs 70% as the LGD assumption. Next part will explain briefly how to measure systemic risk using this model and the credit shock simulation.
In the example of the simulation below, we anlyse the impact of Bank J as the trigger default to the Bank I balance sheet. Figure 3 shows a simplified Bank I balance sheet before Bank J collapses. Bank I has interbank assets at Bank J. Figure 4 demonstrates Bank I balance sheet after Bank J collapses. The assets of Bank I decreased amounted to 70 percent as LGD times the total loan to Bank J. In the right side of Bank I balance sheet, capital of Bank I will cover the losses, which caused reduction within the same amount of the losses suffered by Bank I.
The final step of this model is measuring the systemic risk using two useful measurements, the TCTF risk, and the TCTF vulnerability. The TCTF risk and the TCTF vulnerability are the tools for measuring systemic risk (Lau, 2013) . Both the TCTF risk and the TCTF vulnerability measure loss of individual bank caused by systemic event. The TCTF risk measures how big the impact of a default bank is to the other banks in the system. A default bank will affect the loss in capital to other banks. Meanwhile, the TCTF vulnerability is the measurement of the fragility of a bank if there is bank default in the system (Lau, 2013) . The TCTF vulnerability is the opposite of the TCTF risk. While the TCTF risk measures the loss in the capital of other banks, the TCTF vulnerability measures the loss in the capital of a bank triggered by another banks in the system. The formula of the TCTF risk and the TCTF vulnerability is shown below:
Results and Discussions
This section explains how default bank causes loss in the capital to the other banks and the entire system, identifies which bank that has the highest impact on other banks and which bank is the most vulnerable in the system between 2012 until 2014, based on the default simulation. Table 3 shows the interbank transactions of each Indonesia ICBs in 2012 -2014 among banks in the system. All of the banks in Indonesia ICBs have interbank transaction among banks in the system. Table 4 shows the capital condition of Indonesia ICBs in the research period. 
Capital Losses
The sample banks are considered as a system. The balance sheet network analysis requires an LGD assumption. In this simulation, the LGD assumption is about 70%. Table 5 , 6, and 7 show the default simulation in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Based on the simulation, in the case of BMI, the default will cause the greatest contagion loss in term of Rupiah and more than half banks in the system will be impacted by the BMI. Capital loss in the system has amounted to IDR 307 billion. In case of default, BMI will cause capital loss in BNIS about IDR 175 billion which is the greatest potential loss in this simulation. The second greatest impact is BRIS. If BRIS is default, it will trigger IDR 84 billion capital loss in the system. Surprisingly, the MBSI is the third greatest. The MBSI is considered as small size assets bank, however, in this simulation, the MBSI will trigger IDR 47 billion-capital loss in system. 
In 2013, a new player appeared which is BTPNS. The BTPNS started to operate in the second semester of 2013. In this simulation, the BMI becomes the pole position again within the potential loss amounted to IDR 153 billion in case of default. In the second place is still BRIS within IDR 56 billion of potential capital loss. MBSI is no longer at the third place in 2013, the BSMG has replaced the MBSI as the third greatest impact amounted to IDR 24 billion of potential capital loss in system (see table 6). In 2014, formation of top three most substantial impact banks in the system is not changing. BMI is still in the first position. In case of default, BMI will cause IDR 237 billion capital loss and will cost to BNIS about IDR 162 billion. In the second place, there are two banks, which are BRIS and BSMG. The BRIS and BSMG potentially incur IDR 70 billion of capital loss. The third place is the BNIS. The BNIS will cause capital loss in the system amounting to IDR 59 billion (refer table 7). Table 8 summarizes the simulation result (see Table 6 and Table 7 ). The probability of capital loss in the system would vary every year. Only the BRIS and the BCAS showed the increasing probability of capital loss in the last three years. After determining the losses that caused by fundamental credit shock of each bank we then divided them into two measurements of systemic risk which are the TCTF risk and the TCTF vulnerability.
TCTF Risk of Each Bank
The final output of this study is the TCTF risk and the CTF vulnerability. The TCTF risk refers to the impact of default bank to the other banks relative with affected bank capital. On the other hand, the TCTF vulnerability can be referred as the measurement of the fragility of bank towards bank fundamental shock in the system. In contrast of the TCTF risk, which is associated with interbank liabilities, the TCTF vulnerability is strongly associated with interbank assets relative with its capital. Table  10 . Table 10 shows the riskiest bank to the least risky bank in the system based on the last three years average. The greatest score of the TCTF means the riskiest bank in the system.
The BMI recorded the greatest TCTF risk in three consecutive three years. This is not surprising because the BMI was the largest player on interbank liabilities in 2012, 2013, and 2014 (see table 4 ). The average of the TCTF risk in the last three years shows that the BMI is the riskiest bank in the system even though the BMI was not the largest bank in the system. Table 10 shows the TCTF vulnerability index between 2012 and 2014 of each bank and ranks based on the last three years average. The two largest assets size bank, the BMI and the BSM were not included in the vulnerable bank list. The BCAS, which is a small size bank, was the most fragile bank in the system (see Table 4 ). The BCAS was the third largest interbank assets player in the system.
TCTF Vulnerability of Each Bank
As interbank transactions, banks capital has a big role in the systemic events. The capital of a bank could reduce significantly on the fragility of bank. It has been proven that the BSM was the largest player in the interbank assets (see Table 4 ), but the BSM was not included in the top 5 fragile bank (see Table  10 ). This is because the BSM has huge capital or even the largest capital compared to other bank in the system which is amounted to almost IDR 5 trillion (see Table 5 ).
Conclusions
Based on the default simulation, three results have been recorded which are potential capital losses, TCTF risk and TCTF vulnerability. The greatest potential losses that will be suffered by the system arose when the BMI collapses (see Table 9 ). The BMI is the riskiest bank in the system which is within 3.61 score of the TCTF risk of three years average (see Table 10 ). Meanwhile, the most fragile bank in the system is the BCAS on three years average of the TCTF vulnerability score (see Table 11 ). Based on the results of this study, we derive at least two findings which are linearity systemic risk with interbank transaction and the capital adequacy to reduce systemic risk.
The linearity between systemic risk and interbank transaction has been confirmed by the current research and supported previous finding by Aldasoro et al. (2013) and Lau (2013) . In contrast, another study found that a less informative balance sheet approach compared to the market approach because of accounting rules being less informative (Borri et al., 2012) . Market approach will not answer the main problem of systemic risk. Meanwhile, the balance sheet network approach will provide more complex and closer to the reality. Kuzubas et al. (2014) in their study had demonstrated the balance sheet network approach through centrality model to analyse the role of interbank transaction on the Turkish financial crisis in 2000 and the result is that, the interbank has a big role towards the systemic event. Gai et al. (2011) also confirmed that a more complex and concentrated financial system will lead to a greater fragility of the system.
In relation to capital adequacy, this study found that stronger capital proportion on banks balance sheet will significantly reduce the fragility of the bank itself. This is supported by this study. Large size banks will not have big contribution if the banks' capital is large and adequate to cover fundamental shock (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong, 2014) . Anand, et al. (2013) also reported the same finding about capital adequacy in which they stated that the capital strengthen the stability of an interconnected institution.
This study still have many shortcomings. Wider coverage of study is needed, because in reality the ICBs not only have transaction among them but also with conventional banks too. Increase banks sample would be better for future research.
